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Hyde: The Motion In Limine: Pretrial Trump Card in Civil Litigation

COMMENTARIES
THE MOTION IN LIMINE: PRETRIAL TRUMP CARD
IN CIVIL LITIGATION
A motion in limine, is a motion made prior to trial2 for the purpose of
prohibiting opposing counsel from mentioning the existence of, alluding
to, or offering evidence on matters so highly prejudicial to the moving
party that a timely motion to strike or an instruction by the court to the
jury to disregard the offending matter cannot overcome its prejudicial influence on the juror's minds. 3 The motion seeks a protective order 4 prohibiting the opposing party, counsel, and witnesses from mentioning or offering the
offending evidence at trial without first requesting permission of the court
out of the presence of the jury. 5 Though the motion in limine often embraces
a prayer for the exclusion of the evidence itself,6 strictly speaking, the motion
operates on the premise that the mere asking of an improper question concerning the sensitive material in dispute in the presence of the jury will so
1.

"On or at the threshold; at the very beginning; preliminarily."

BLAcK's LAW

Dic-

TIONARY 896 (4th ed. rev. 1968). This broad definition means that virtually any motion

made prior to the empaneling of the jury is a motion in limine. The following discussion,
however, will use the term as it has been popularly described in practice, as set forth
in the text accompanying notes 3-8 infra.
2. An appropriate time for the motion would be the pretrial conference, but the
motion may be made any time prior to the empaneling of the jury. See Note, The Motion
In Limine-A Useful Procedural Device, 35 MONT. L. REv. 362, 363 (1974); Note, Pretrial
Exclusionary Evidence Rulings, 1967 WIs. L. Rav. 738, 739, 745 (1967).
3. E.g., Burrus v. Silhavy, 293 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. App. 1973); Bridges v. City of Richardson, 163 Tex. 292, 293, 354 S.W.2d 366, 367 (1962); Rothblatt & Leroy, The Motion In
Liminie [sic] in Criminal Trials: A Technique for PretrialExclusion of Prejudicial Evidence,
60 Ky. L.J. 611, 613-14 (1972). The authors distinguish two kinds of prohibitive motions
in limine: "prohibitive-absolute," in which the prejudicial matter is found inadmissible at
the outset and excluded throughout the trial, and "prohibitive-preliminary," which permits opposing counsel to offer the sensitive matter at trial out of the jury's presence for a
de novo ruling. Id. at 615-16. Cf. Note, 1967 Wis. L. REv., supra note 2, at 755. Because
it is the "prohibitive-preliminary" form, which is most often used and is preferred by
courts and counsel, it is this form of the motion that will be discussed herein.
4. Note, 1967 Wis. L. Rlv., supra note 2, at 744. See Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 3, at
615-17.
5. E.g., Redding v. Ferguson, 501 S.W.2d 717, 722 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Davis, Motions
In Limine, 15 CLEv.-MAR. L. Rv. 255 (1966). This article also appears, with few alterations,
in 5 WAStBURN L.J. 232 (1966) and as chapter 7 of A. CONE & V. LAwYER, THE ART OF
PERSUASION IN LrIIGATION (1966). Mr. Davis, who is a practicing attorney in Texas, sets
forth an example of a motion in limine on which an order in limine would be based. A
suggested sample form for a motion in limine adopted for Florida use, based primarily on
Mr. Davis' example, appears in the Appendix to this commentary. Davis, supra at 255 n.1.
6. Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 85, 500 P.2d 335, 345 (1972) (dictum);
Burdick v. York Oil Co., 364 S.W.2d 766, 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). Cf. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co. v. McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex. 1963). The motion is often, therefore, based on settled rules of evidence. See Davis, supra note 5, at 257-61; Note, 1967
Wis. L. Rxv., supra note 2, at 739, 751-52.
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implant prejudice in the jurors' minds that the moving party will effectively
be denied his right to a fair trial. 7 Necessarily, therefore, the protective order
must embrace counsel's statements in voir dire, opening statement, and
closing argument as well as the evidentiary phases of the trial.8 Extensively
used in Texas, 9 and adopted 0 or recognized expressly or impliedly xl by a
growing number of other jurisdictions, the motion in limine serves the salutary
purpose of helping to reduce the possibility of reversible error at trial,
thereby safeguarding the rights of both parties to a fair trial. 2
While the expansive discovery procedures provided for by the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure'- and the broad and flexible uses of the pretrial
conference 14 should obviate the need for extensive employment of the in
limine practice in Florida,15 the very fact that Florida appellate decisions 6
7. The Texas supreme court expressed this idea succinctly in Bridges v. City of
Richardson. 163 Tex. 292, 293, 354 S.W.2d 366, 367 (1962): "The purpose of the motion
in limine to suppress evidence or to instruct opposing counsel not to offer it is to prevent
the asking of prejudicial questions and the making of prejudicial statements in the
presence of the jury with respect to matters which ha e no proper bearing on the issues
in the case or on the rights of the parties to the suit. It is the prejudicial effect of the
question asked or the statements made in connection with the offer of evidence, not the
prejudicial effect of the evidence itself, which a motion in limine is intended to reach."
The motion is worded accordingly, e.g., Burrus v. Silhavy, 293 N.E.2d 794, 796 (Ind. App.
1973); Davis, supra note 5, at 255 n.l.
8. Cf. Troxel v. Otto, 287 N.E.2d 791, 792-94 (Ind. App. 1972).
9. E.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. 1963);
Bridges v. City of Richardson, 163 Tex. 292, 354 S.W.2d 366 (1962); Redding v. Ferguson,
501 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Harlow v. Swift & Co., 491 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1973); McKellar v. Bracewell, 473 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); State v. Wheeler,
390 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
10. Burrus v. Silhavy, 293 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. App. 1973).
11. Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 85, 500 P.2d 335, 345 (1972) (dictum in
affirming the trial court's denial of defendant's motion in linine indicating the appellate
court's decision impliedly recognized the motion as a valid pretrial procedural step); Sacramento &cSan Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Reed, 215 Cal. App. 2d 60, 68, 29 Cal. Rptr. 847,
852 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Doyle v. City of New York, 281 App. Div. 821, 822, 119 N.Y.S.2d
71, 72 (1953). Cf. Cook v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 414 Pa. 154, 156, 199 A.2d 446, 44748 (1964); Crawford v. Hite, 176 Va. 69, 78, 10 S.E.2d 561, 564 (1940) (dictum). Contra,
Bradford v. Birmingham Elec. Co., 227 Ala. 285, 287, 149 So. 729, 730 (1933).
12. Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 3, at 635; Note, 1967 Wis. L. REV., supra note 2, at
742.
13. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.280-.390.
14. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.200. Informatihe amplification of the purposes, scope and fruits
of the Florida pretrial conference appears in FLORIDA CIVIL PRACTICE BEFORE TRIAL, ch.
17 (Fla. Bar Continuing Legal Educ. Manual No. 11, 2d ed. 1969).
15. One experienced Florida attorney suggests that the combined use of extensive
discovery procedures and the pretrial conference should render resort to the motion in
linine unnecessary except in the most unusual circumstances. Mr. Mark Hulsey, a former
president of the Florida Bar Association, stated that, in his experience, trial counsel on
both sides, familiar with the requirements of the rules of evidence and the commands of
ethics, will scrupulously avoid introduction of prejudicial matters in order to foreclose
the possibilities of mistrial and reversible error. He expressed the opinion that matters
addressed by a motion in limine. which he has not had occasion to use, are generally taken
up at the pretrial conference and action taken therein included in the pretrial order.
Interview with Mr. Mark Hulsey, Jr., in Gainesville, Fla., April 17, 1974. While in general
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continue to reverse lower courts for allowing prejudicial error at trial shows
that even these substantial pretrial safeguards may not always guarantee a
trial free from harmful error.1 7 Accordingly, this commentary, after examining
the development and application of the motion in limine in other jurisdictions,
will demonstrate how it may appropriately be employed by trial counsel in
Florida civil litigation.' s
BACKGROUND

Commentators agree 9 that the motion in limine made its first appearance
in Bradford v._ Birmingham Electric Co., 20 a 1933 Alabama case wherein
plaintiff, in an action for injuries she received while riding defendant's streetcar, attempted/to obtain a pretrial order prohibiting defense counsel from
offering testimonial evidence as to her, character. 21 The trial court denied the
motion, and was upheld on appeal by the Alabama supreme court, which
latly denied the existence of "a rule of law or of practice in this state"22
that would ipermit the granting of: such a motion. The court also" justified
its ruling on the logical ground that the trial court was in no position to
assume counsel would attempt to introduce "illegal" evidence at trial. 23 Additionally, the court noted that the granting of such a motion prior to trial
would run counter to solidly established trial procedure.24 This latter justification is based on the traditional Anglo-American view of the trial as a
self-contained, cohesive whole. To question the admissibility of evidence or
attempt to prohibit its mention or production before trial, according to this
line of reasoning, is to bifurcate the trial and to decide the issues in piecemeal
agreement with Mr. Hulsey as to the efficacy of the discovery and pretrial conference
techniques to prevent injection of prejudicial matters at trial, Mr. Michael Bryant, a
practicing attorney in Gainesville, Fla., acknowledged that situations could arise wherein
the motion in limine could be useful. Mr. Bryant suggested that in circuits where civil
dockets are crowded, or where the pretrial conference is conducted in a perfunctory fashion,
the written motion seeking a specific protective order could be helpful. Interview with
Mr. Michael L. Bryant, in Gainesville, Fla., April 15, 1974. The same reasoning applies in
areas where the pretrial conference is not extensively used.
16. E.g., Cook v. Eney, 277 So. 2d 848 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973); Walton v. Robert E.
Haas Constr. Corp., 259 So. 2d 731 (3d D.C.A. Fla;- 1972); Dade County v. Clarson, 240
So. 2d 828 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970); Carlton v.-Johns, 194 So. 2d 670 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967);City of Coral Gables v.-Jordan, 186 So. 2d 60 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
17. One major reason why the motion in limine is not used in Florida is that Florida
lawyers are simply unaware of it. Interview with Hon. John J. Crews, Jr., Judge, CircuitCourt for the Eighth Judicial Circuit, Florida, in Gainesville, Fla., April 17, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Crews Interview].
18. For a thoughtful and informative examination of the applicability of the motion
in limine in criminal practice, much of which is germane to the present discussion, see
Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 3.
19. Rothblatt & Leroy,. sutpra note 3, at 615;"Note,-1967 Wis. L. REV., supra note 2, at
738.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

"

227 Ala. 285, 149 So. 729: (1933).
Id. at 287, 149 So. at 730.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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fashion.25 The reasoning and result of Bradford26 were paralleled in a Kentucky decision. -7 The essential thrust of decisions refusing to recognize the
validity of the motion in limine is that the trial court has no way of determining in advance of trial whether the allegedly prejudicial matters would in
28
fact be prejudicial to the moving party when offered at trial.
Despite its inauspicious beginning, the motion in limine survived because
counsel recognized a continuing need to preclude injection of prejudicial
matters into the trial in those cases where such matters could be anticipated
and where a showing of the prejudicial effect could be demonstrated to the
court in limine. Thus, the Virginia supreme court suggested its use as early
as 1940 in a wrongful death action; -9 the California Third District Court of
Appeal sanctioned it in a 1963 eminent domain proceeding; 3° and the
31
Pennsylvania supreme court approved it in a 1964 personal injury action.
Additionally, the in limine practice was specifically held to be "part of the
procedural practice of Indiana ' ' 32 in Burrus v. Silhavy. s 3 In that personal injury action defendants filed a motion in limine seeking an order prohibiting
mention by plaintiff, his counsel, or witnesses of a $7,000 payment made
25. The rapid growth of discovery procedures, the use of the pretrial conference, and
pretrial motions to suppress illegally seized evidence in criminal cases demonstrate that
this traditional view has lost much of its vitality. Note, 1967 Wis. L. REV., supra note 2,
at 746-47.
26. In addition to the reasoning described in the text accompanying notes 23-25 supra,
the Bradford court cited other reasons for affirming the verdict and judgment for defendant
on the question of prejudice, which reappear in current appellate decisions examining the
correctness of the trial court's decision in denying a motion in limine. After plaintiff's
pretrial motion to exclude was denied, counsel for plaintiff "opened the door" at trial
to the allegedly prejudicial matters by questioning plaintiff in detail about the nature of
her acquaintance with the defense witness, who subsequently was questioned by defense
counsel about the same subject. Moreover, after the defense testimony was given, plaintiff's
counsel did not move to strike what he claimed on appeal were an objectionable question
and answer. Under these circumstances the court refused to hold the question and responsive
testimony reversible error. 227 Ala. at 288, 149 So. at 731.
27. Carrithers v. Jean's Ex'r. 259 Ky. 20, 22-23, 81 S.W.2d 857, 858 (1935).
28. This argument is still available, of course, to opposing counsel and is successfully
employed where the moving party cannot show either that the evidence in question is
excludable under the technical rules of evidence or that its prejudicial effect far outweighs
any slight materiality it may have. See, e.g., Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 85,
500 P.2d 335, 345 (1972). This argument is buttressed by the reasoning that should the
offending matters be injected into the trial, counsel may resort to the existing "curative"
measures of objecting to an offer of evidence or question by opposing counsel, moving to
strike the offending material from the record, and requesting the court to instruct to disregard the prejudicial material. The underlying Premise of the motion in limine, however,
is that the circumstances of the particular case and the sensitive nature of the subject
matter of the motion are such that these traditional safeguards would not be sufficient
to eradicate the prejudice to the moving party. Davis, supra note 5, at 256. See Rothblatt &
Leroy, supra note 3, at 613; Note, 1967 Wis. L. Rav., supra note 2, at 740.
29. Crawford v. Hite, 176 Va. 69, 78, 10 S.E.2d 561, 564 (1940) (dictum).
30. Sacramento &- San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Reed, 215 Cal. App. 2d 60, 66-68, 29
Cal. Rptr. 847, 852-53 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
31. Cook v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 414 Pa. 154, 156, 199 A.2d 446, 447-48 (1964).
32. Burrus v. Silhavy, 293 N.E.2d 794 (Ind. App. 1973).
33. Id. at 798.
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by a third-party insurance company to plaintiff prior to the trial, on the
ground that the mere mention of the payment would be highly prejudicial
to defendants' case. 34 The trial court granted the motion, and was affirmed
by the Appellate Court of Indiana, which held:
A "motion in limine" is a necessary adjunct to the trial
herent power to admit and exclude evidence. The trial
issue protective orders against prejudicial questions or
which could be uttered before a jury and thereby prevent
impartial jury trial.35

court's incourt may
statements
a fair and

AuTHOmT

The Burrus court noted that there was no statutory authority for the
motion in limine, and that it was not mentioned in the Indiana Rules of
Civil Procedure. 36 Counsel attempting its use will likely not find specific
authorization for it in statutes or rules whether state or federal.3 7 Nevertheless,
it is convincingly argued by commentators 38 that the power to entertain motions in limine flows from the inherent power of the trial court to admit
or exclude evidence. This reasoning was found persuasive by the Burrus
court. 39 The power to grant or deny motions in limine is also said to arise
under the general wording of subsection (6) of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16,4 0 and those state rules modeled thereon, 41 which permit the trial
court and counsel to consider "such other matters as may aid in the disposition
of the action" during pretrial conference. 42 One commentator suggests that
both the history of rule 16 and its permissive nature indicate that the pretrial
conference was not intended to permit "coercive" rulings on such matters as
are addressed by motions in limine.4" Nevertheless, the commentator
recognizes that trial courts regularly use the conference as a forum in which
to rule on evidentiary issues, citing subsection (6) as "authority."- While
34. Id. at 795.
35. Id. at 797.
36. Id.
37. Davis, supra note 5, at 257. Cf. Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 3, at 614; Note, 1967
Wis. L. Rzv., supra note 2, at 746.
38. Davis, supra note 5, at 257; Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 3, at 615.
39. 293 N.E.2d at 797-98.
40. Rothblatt &Leroy, supra note 3, at 614.
41. E.g., FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.200; Tax R. Civ. P. 166; WIs. STAT. §269.65 (1965).
42. The exact wording of FED. R. Civ. P. 116(6) is contained in the corresponding
sections of the state rules, cited note 41 supra. Cf. FLORIDA CIVIL PRACrIcE BFoaR TRILL,
Pretrial Conference §17.7 (Fla. Bar Continuing Legal Educ. Practice Manual No. 11, 2d
ed. 1969).
43. Note, 1967 Wis. L. REv., supra note 2, at 748.
44. Id. at 749-50. Although the author suggests "legitimizing" the motion in limine
by codification, id. at 750, it would appear that in making a motion in limine, counsel can
persuasively argue for the existence of authority in the court to entertain and rule on
the motion on the basis of the inherent power of the trial court, the "penumbra" of pretrial conference rules, and the growing body of case law recognizing the motion, See
text accompanying notes 36-43 supra.
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specific incorporation of the motion in limine into statutes or rules may be
desirable to delineate the circumstances and parameters governing its use,
it seems clear from the foregoing that such statutory approval is not necessary
45
for its employment.
THE DILEMMA

The tactical value of the motion in limine is illustrated by the trial attorney's dilemma when confronted with the introduction by opposing counsel
or witnesses of prejudicial matter before the jury. For example, improper
reference might be made to the issuance of a traffic ticket in connection with
the automobile accident that is the subject matter of the litigation. 4 6 One

alternative is to object and request the court to instruct the jury to disregard.
As has been pointed out,47 however, this tactic may serve to further implant
the prejudice in the minds of the jurors rather than eradicate it, 4 I especially

because it is customary for the court to instruct the jury to disregard the
offending material both at the time the objection is made and when the jury
instructions are given. 49 Objection may also cause the jury, which cannot be
expected to distinguish "legal relevancy" from "logical relevancy," 50 to suspect that objecting counsel has something to hide.51 The other alternative
is for counsel to remain silent in the hope that failure to emphasize the sensitive matter will minimize its prejudicial effect.5 2 But if counsel fails to make

timely objection when the offensive matter is injected and subsequently suffers
an adverse verdict, he will be deemed to have waived the right to raise the

45. Circuit Judge, John J. Crews, Jr., of Gainesville, Florida, indicated he would
entertain such a motion under the pretrial conference rule, FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.200. Crews
Interview, supra note 17.
46. This actually happened in Walton %.Robert E. Haas Constr. Corp., 259 So. 2d
731 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972), and Riedel v. Driscoll, 124 So. 2d 42 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1960),
and is discussed in further delail in text accompanying notes 101-105 infra.
47. Davis, supra note 5, at 256; Note, 1967 Wis. L. REv., supra note 2, at 741. The
courts often concur, e.g., Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Reed, 215 Cal. App.
2d 60, 68, 29 Cal. Rptr. 847, 853 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Pensacola Transit Co. v. Denton,
119 So. 2d 296, 298 (1st D.C.A..Fla. 1960). Cf. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Smith, 53 Fla. 375, 43
So. 235 (1908) (instruction insufficient to cure prejudicial statement in closing argument).
Contra, Tyus %.Apalachicola N.R.R., 130 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 1961); Wall v. Little, 102 Fla.
1015, 1018, 136 So. 676, 677 (1931).
48. This dilemma is vividly illustrated by Compania Dominicana de Aviacion v. Knapp,
251 So. 2d 18 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1971), where, after a witness for plaintiff volunteered improper testimony concerning insurance payments, plaintiff's counsel requested the court
out of the jury's presence to strike the testimony and instruct the jury to disregard it.
Fearing that such action would serve only to further implant the damaging evidence
into the jurors' minds, defense counsel objected, and the trial court said nothing further
about it. On appeal from an adverse verdict, defendant contended unsuccessfully that the
testimony constituted reversible error. Id. at 20.
49. Note, 1967 Wis. L. REv., supra note 2,at 741 & n.24.
50. Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 3, at 622.
51. Davis, supra note 5, at 256.
52. Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 3, at 613.
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issue of prejudicial error on appeal. 51 Even if counsel does make timely objection to the mention of offer of prejudicial matter at trial, he may yet fail
on appeal by reason of the harmless error rule, 54 which embodies the view
that a litigant has a right to a trial free from harmful or reversible error, but
not necessarily devoid of any error.55
THE- SOLUTION
It is precisely this dilemma that the motion in limine eliminates. If the
motion is granted and a protective order issued pursuant thereto, 5 the
opposing party, counsel, and witnesses are placed on formal notice not to
make any allusion to the sensitive subject matter 7 without first seeking the
express permission of the court out of the presence and hearing of the jury.55
Moving counsel therefore eliminates ab initio the need either to object to
improper questions or remarks or to move to strike prejudicial material and
request an instruction to the jury to disregard after the offending matter
has already been heard. 59 That the order in limine effectively prevents introduction of prejudicial material into the trial is shown by the relative paucity
of cases concerning alleged violations of the order in limine. The holdings
of these few cases indicate that violation of the order is committed on pain
60
of mistrial or reversible error.
The motion in limine, particularly where accompanied by a memorandum
'or brief on a complex or unsettled area of law, provides the court an opportunity to give more protracted and studied consideration to the possibility
of prejudice being injected into the trial.61 Such an opportunity is normally

53. Id. See, e.g., McKinney Supply Co. v. Orovitz, 96 So. 2d 209, 211 (Fla. 1957); Hartford Accident & Indem. C6. v. McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex. 1963); Crawford v.
Hite, 176 Va. 69, 78, 10 S.E.2d 561, 564 (1940) (dictum).
.. 54. E.g., Stecher v. Pomeroy, 253 So. 2d 421 (Fla- 1971); Futch v. Josey, 263 So. 2d
240 (2d D.C.A. FMa. 1972), cause dismissed, 279 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1973).
55. See, e.g., Compania Dominicana de Aviacion v. Knapp, 251 So. 2d 18 (3d D.C.A.
Fla. 1971).
56. See note 2 supra.
57. E.g., Redding v. Ferguson, 501 S.W.2d 717, 722 (rex. Civ. App. 1973). Cf. Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Reed, 214 Cal. App. 2d 60, 66-68, 29 Cal. Rptr. 847,
852-53 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); see Appendix.
58. Id.
59. Davis, supra note 5, at 256.
60. MAPCO, Inc. v. Holt, 476 S.W.2d 70, 75-76 (rex. Civ. App. 1971); Burdick v. York
Oil Co., 364 S.W.2d 766, 770 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). On the other hand, a witness' indirect
-and fleeting reference to matters prohibited by the order granting a motion in limine
had been held insufficiently violative of the order to constitute reversible error. Harlow
v. Swift & Co., 491 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). Obviously, if a party who has
obtained an order in limine proceeds to mention and offer evidence concerning the allegedly prejudicial matters at trial, then the door is open for opposing counsel to discuss
and introduce evidence previously excluded by the order. See Royal v. Cameron, 382 S.W.2d
335, 340-41 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964); Bradford v. Birmingham Elec. Co., 227- Ala. 285, 149
So. 729 (1933); note 26 supra.
61. See Davis, supra note 5, at 256.
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unavailable in the charged atmosphere of a trial in which the court is re62
quired to make decisions rapidly and often without adequate time to reflect.
Further, the granting of the motion can never be reversible error because
opposing counsel may at trial, out of the jury's presence, again request the
court to permit admission of the sensitive matter. 63 If the court still agrees
with moving counsel that the subject matter of the motion in limine would
be prejudicial and excludes it, it is the exclusion of the evidence that forms
4
the basis for appeal.
Similarly, the denial of a motion in limine is not reversible error 65 because
the allegedly prejudicial matters must in fact be mentioned or introduced as
evidence before they can be said to have influenced a jury to any degree.
Further, the disputed matter must be shown to be so prejudicial to the
affected party as to constitute reversible error.0 6 Clearly the burden to demonstrate to the trial court that the matters sought to be prohibited from offer or
mention are prejudicial is on the party making the motion. 67 Denial of the
motion, therefore, indicates only that the moving party failed to meet this
burden, and a survey of decisions discussing the motion in limine shows that
this is often the case. 68 It follows that in the event a party's motion in limine
is denied, he will be expected to resort to normal "curative" procedures such
as objection or motion to strike, if the offending matters are brought to the
jury's attention. 69 From the foregoing it should be clear that the burden on
the moving party constitutes a limitation on the use of the motion in limine
and renders less likely the possibility of its abuse. 0
62. Mr. Davis suggests that for this reason the court will be more inclined to grant
the motion in the pretrial milieu. Id.

63. Id. at 257.
64. Id.
65. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex. 1963).
But see Doyle v. City of New York, 281 App. Div. 821, 119 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1953), and text
accompanying notes 77-78 infra.
66. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex. 1963).
67. Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 3, at 621-24. Cf. Note, 1967 Wis. L. REv., supra
note 2, at 742.
68. E.g., Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 85, 500 P.2d 335, 345 (1972). Cf.
McKellar v. Bracewell, 473 S.W.2d 542, 546 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971); City of Wichita Falls
v. Jones, 456 S.W.2d 148, 150 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (plaintiff's motion in Iiinine denied
in part); Export Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 401 S.W.2d 324, 325 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
69. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McCardell, 369 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex. 1963);
City of Wichita Falls v. Jones, 456 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). But see Rothblatt &
Leroy, supra note 3, at 618, wherein the authors suggest that denial of the motion puts
counsel in a position to argue on appeal that the trial court tainted the trial at the outset
by impliedly permitting opposing counsel to "parade prejudice in front of the jury." The
cases cited above, however, suggest that appellate courts will find this argument persuasive
only if moving counsel objected to the prejudicial matter when it was mentioned or introduced at trial.
70. Moreover, the effective use of the pretrial conference and the resulting pretrial
order should limit the need for the formal use of the motion in most cases. Crews Interview, supra note 17. Obviously, a "shotgun" approach in using the motion in limine would
dilute its effectiveness by making it vulnerable to arguments that it is being used to
restrict unduly issues that should be the legitimate subject of evidentiary inquiry at
trial. See Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 3, at 619. For these reasons the motion in limine
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APPLICATION

The motion in limine attacks two general groups of prejudicial materials.
The first group includes matters excludable at trial under established
technical rules of evidence such as the hearsay rule, best evidence rule,
"collateral source" rule, and rules pertaining to privilege. 71 Thus, in Burdick
v. York Oil Co.7 2 plaintiff in a personal injury action successfully filed a motion in limine to exclude mention or offer of records of the Veterans Administration, basing the motion on privilege.73 Defense counsel's willful disregard
of the order granting the motion, evidenced by his constant reference to the
excluded records both in cross-examination and final argument, 74 was held
reversible error on appeal. In Doyle v. City of New York 75 the court held it
prejudicial and reversible error for the trial court not to grant plaintiff's pretrial motion, based on the hearsay rule, to exclude part of a hospital record
containing a patient's history. The erxor was compounded in that defense
counsel, through constant allusion at trial to the sensitive history, deliberately
intended to influence the jury into believing plaintiff was a chronic alcoholic
and drug addict; and that he was intoxicated at the time of the accident.76
The defendants in Burrus v. SilhaVy 77 successfully moved the court in limine
to prohibit mention or offer at trial of a $7,000 prepayment of insurance to
plaintiff on the ground of immateriality.78 In Cook v. Philadelphia Transit
7
Co9.
plaintiff, struck by defendant's bus at 2:00 a.m. in the vicinity of an
establishment with the "wild cognomen" of "Crazy Bar," 0 obtained a pretrial
order prohibiting defense counsel from mentioning that "image-creating
sobriquet" 8' in the presence of the jury. Although the report of the case does
not set forth the contents of plaintiff's motion, it appears from Judge Musmanno's entertaining but solid opinion that it was based on grounds of im8 2
materiality and irrelevance.
If the trial court opines that the material sought to be excluded by a
motion in limine may in fact be admissible under the rules of evidence, or
that it is impossible to determine in advance of trial that the materials would
be prejudicial or inadmissible,8 3 it will properly deny the motion, leaving the
should be regarded, as the title of this commentary suggests, as a procedural "trump card"
to be employed in special situations where the likelihood of introduction of prejudicial
matter at trial can be demonstrated positively.
71. Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 3, at 621; Note, 1967 Wis. L. Rlv., supra note 2, at
751; cf. Davis, supra note 5, at 257-58.
72. 364 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).

73. Id. at 767.
74. Id. at 768-69.
75. 281 App. Div. 821, 119 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1953).
76. Id. at 822, 119 N.Y.S.2d at 72.

77. 293 N.E.2d 794 (1973).
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 796.
414 Pa. 154, 199 A.2d 446 (1964).
Id. at 158, 199 A.2d at 448.
Id. at 159, 199 A.2d at 448.
Id. at 156-60, 199 A.2d at 447-49. But see text accompanying note 93 infra.
This was the case in Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972),
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burden on the moving party to make timely objection if the allegedly prejudicial matters are subsequently introduced at trial.4 If counsel foresees that
such would be the case, then the motion in limine should be directed toward
the second group of evidentiary matters within its ambit, that is, material "the
minor relevance of which is outweighed by its potentially prejudicial effect
on the jury". 85 The basis for making the motion to prevent introduction of
matters of this nature at trial is that whatever tangential relevance the objectionable material may have, its probative value with respect to the material
issues of the case is far outbalanced by its prejudicial influence. s6 For example,
the defendant in State v. Wheeler,8 7 a Texas eminent domain action, obtained
an order in limine preventing plaintiff from mentioning the potentially
prejudicial fact that the defendant-condemnee had purchased the property
89
in question for the sole purpose of speculation. s8 In Harlow v. Swift & Co.,
a breach of warranty action, plaintiff-buyer successfully moved the court in
limine to prohibit defendant-seller from making any reference to any other
litigation by plaintiff against other feed companiesf ° And in Huff v. New
York Central R.R.,59 an Ohio wrongful death action, the trial court excluded
in limine any reference at trial to a letter from decedent's daughter to the
President of the United States describing the crossing where her father had
been killed as a "death trap," and to the subsequent installation of blinkers
and other equipment at the crossing.92
The foregoing examples are presented only to indicate both the broad
variety of actions and kinds of evidence with respect to which the motion
in limine may be employed effectively in a manner advantageous to both
sides in civil litigation. On occasion, the prejudicial matters sought to be
prohibited may not seem to fit conveniently into one of the two classes of
evidence mentioned above,9 3 but careful drafting and a convincing demonstration of the prejudicial effect of the objectionable matter should suffice to
obtain the desired order. Among the matters suggested by commentators as
amenable to the motion in limine are the status of a party or witness, 9 4 pena medical malpractice action wherein the trial court denied defendant doctor's motion
in limine seeking to prohibit reference by plaintiff's counsel to previous malpractice
actions against defendant based on similar factual circumstances.

84. Id. at 85, 500 P.2d at 345.
Davis, supra note 5, at 258; Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 3, at 622; Note, 1967
REV., supra note 2, at 753-54. See C. MCCORMIcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 319 (1954).
86. See Davis, supra note 5, at 256; Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 3, at 622.
87. 390 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. Cir. App. 1965).
88. Id. at 342.
89. 491 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
90. Id. at 477.
91. Reported in 12 DEFENSE L.J. 310, aJJ'd without reaching question, 116 Ohio App.
32, 186 N.E.2d 478 (1961).
92. Id.
93. E.g., Cook v. Philadelphia Transit Co., 414 Pa. 154, 199 A.2d 446 (1964), discussed in text accompanying notes 79-82 supra.
94. Such as drug or alcohol addiction, marital status, or economic status. Rothblatt &
Leroy, supra note 3, at 625.
85.

Wis. L.
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sions and other payments made to injured parties,95 criminal convictions,"
prior suits or settlements, 97 and, in some instances, opinions of investigating
officers. 98 This list is by no means exclusive; in theory, at least the motion
in limine should be available to block the introduction before the jury, by
whatever means and at whatever stage of the trial-of any highly prejudicial
matter involved in a particular action. Its application is limited only by the
ingenuity of counsel.
USE OF THE NOTION

In

Limine

IN FLORIDA

As indicated at the outset of this commentary,99 wide-scale use of the motion
in limine in Florida100 is likely unnecessary due to diligent and extensive
use of discovery procedures and the pretrial conference. Situations may arise,
however, when counsel will be confronted with the likelihood of unfairly
prejudicial matters being introduced at trial. In these instances thg additional
protections afforded by the motion in limine are desirable. To illustrate
potential areas of application of the motion in Florida, the following brief
survey of selected Florida cases shows instances in which the motion could
have been employed effectively.
In Riedel v. Driscoll,1 1 a personal injury action arising out of an automobile accident, a question about the instructions arose among the jurors
after the jury had retired. After the jury had returned for additional instructions, one juror asked the court whether defendant had been given a
traffic ticket in connection with the accident. After stating that "what happened in the traffic court in Daytona Beach is of no concern to the jury in
trying this case,"'1 2 the court, still in the presence of the jury, inquired whether
counsel agreed. Defense counsel replied, "yes," but counsel for the plaintiff
replied, "Unfortunately yes, Your Honor."'' Defense counsel's prompt motion
for a mistrial was denied, but the First District Court of Appeal reversed the
subsequent verdict and judgment-for plaintiff and remanded the case for a
new trial. 04 In this case a motion in limine granted to defendant would in
95. Davis, supra note 5, at 257-58.
96. Id. at 259.
97. Id. at 260.
98. Id.
99. See notes 18-16 supra and accompanying text.
100. Authority for the use of the motion in limine in Florida is set forth in the
general discussion of the subject in the text accompanying notes 86-45 supra. Cf. Johnny
Roberts, Inc. v. Owens, 168 So. 2d 89, 92 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1964) (dictum). Decisional support
for use of the motion is found in the cases cited in notes 9-11 supra.
101. 124 So. 2d 42 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
102. Id; at 47.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 48. A factual parallel to Riedel occurred in Walton v. Robert E. Haas
Constr. Corp., 259 So. 2d 781 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1972), a personal injury action wherein defense
counsel, in cross examining the investigating police officer, asked if he had issued a traffic
ticket to one of the plaintiffs after the automobile accident in question. Plaintiff's objection
was sustained, and the jury was instructed to disregard the question, but plaintiff's motion
for a mistrial was denied. Citing Riedel, inter alia, the Third District Court of Appeal held
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all likelihood have prevented the reversible error. First, having granted an
order prohibiting any mention or offer of evidence pertaining to the issuance
counsel the question that prompted the reversible error. Second, even if the
court had asked the question, it seems probable that plaintiff's counsel, under
the onus of the in limine order, would have refrained from making his
prejudicial remark.1° 5
In Cook v. Eney, 10 6 a 1973 medical malpractice action, counsel for the
defendant questioned plaintiff in cross-examination about plaintiff's receipt
of workmen's compensation and Social Security benefits. Reversing a verdict
and judgment for defendant, the Third District Court of Appeal found such
questions and answers prejudicial to plaintiff and remanded the action for
a new trial.1 7 Clearly, a motion in limine introduced at the pretrial conference would have eliminated the subsequent harmful error at the trial of
the case and avoided the need for a new trial.
In Perper v. Edell, 05 wherein plaintiff sued for a substantial real estate
commission based upon a verbal listing contract allegedly made with defendant, defendant introduced at trial over the objection of plaintiff the expert testimony of two doctors to the effect that defendant was a "mental
case," "psychotic," or "insane" at the time of the transaction. 1°9 The Florida
supreme court, on appeal by plaintiff from an adverse verdict, found prejudicial error and remanded the cause for a new trial. Perper was decided in
1949, long before the incorporation of extensive discovery procedures, the
pretrial conference, and rules relating to expert witnesses into the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedures; conceivably, thorough use of these pretrial safeguards would have prevented introduction of the inflammatory testimony
in that case. Still, it is exactly the kind of evidence described in the second
group of matters subject to a motion in liminelo that was prejudicially introduced at trial in Perper. The court in that case enunciated precisely the
reason that employment of the motion in limine would have been appropriate
when, speaking through Justice Roberts, it said:
Even if we concede its [the testimony of the doctors] relevancy . . .
its probative force is still conjectural and remote. We conceive the
rule to be that, if the introduction of the evidence tends in actual
operation to produce a confusion in the minds of the jurors in excess
of the legitimate probative effect of such evidence-if it tends to
obscure rather than illuminate the true issue before the jury-then
such evidence should be excluded."'
that the question was so highly prejudicial that "there was no possibility of erasing its
effects from the minds of the jury" and that the failure of the trial court to grant

plaintiff's motion for a mistrial was reversible error. Id. at 734.
105. For these reasons, it seems logical that employment of a motion in limine by
plaintiff's counsel would have had a similar effect in Walton v. Robert E. Haas Constr.
Corp., 205 So. 2d 731 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960), discussed in note 104 supra. See Appendix.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

277 So. 2d 848 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
Id. at 849-50.
44 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1949).
Id. at 80.
See text accompanying notes 85-91 supra.
44 So. 2d at 80. See C. McCORMICK, supra note 85, at 319-20.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol27/iss2/9

12

Hyde: The Motion In Limine: Pretrial Trump Card in Civil Litigation

1975]

THE MOTION IN LIMINE

In two very similar personal injury cases, City of Coral Gables v. Jordan"'
and Dade County v. Clarson,"I the Third District Court of Appeal found
prejudicial and reversible error where counsel for plaintiffs elicited from
witnesses on direct examination the information that they had previously
settled claims with the defendants prior to trial."14 The court in Jordan
analogized the situation at bar to the commands of Florida Statutes, section 768.041,115 which prohibits revelation to the jury of settlement by the
plaintiff with one of several tortfeasors: "It would seem just as damaging to
a fair trial to permit the injured party to reveal to the jury that the alleged
tortfeasor had settled with another party in the same accident."'1 6 Had the
defendants in Jordan and Clarson filed motions in limine seeking prohibition
of any reference to the settled claims, it appears likely that granting the
motions would have foreclosed the prejudicial error that ultimately forced
the retrial of those cases. Similarly, the reasoning of the court outlined above
suggests that a plaintiff could employ the motion in an action against remaining tortfeasors to prohibit mention by the defense of prior settlement
with one or more tortfeasors no longer parties to the action."17
The complex line of Florida cases"18 dealing with the recurring problem
of the mention at trial of the limits of liability insurance policies points to
another area where the motion in limine could be used. A thorough discussion
of this broad issue, a subject of continual debate in the Florida courts," 9
is beyond the scope of the present inquiry, but the tortuous history of Futch
v. Josey 1 0 serves as an example. At the trial of this personal injury action,
one defendant insurance company voluntarily introduced into evidence
the $10,000 policy limit for its insured defendant. Then, at the request of
plaintiff, the second defendant insurance company was required, over its
objection, to introduce the policy limit on its insured defendant, which was
$250,000. The verdict for plaintiff exceeded $143,000. The Second District
Court of Appeal held that introduction of the policy limits was prejudicial
error,' 2' but on certiorari the Florida supreme court, citing Stecher v.
112. 186 So. 2d 60 (3d D.CA.), aff'd, 191 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1966).
113. 240 So. 2d 828 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1970).
114. Dade County v. Clarson, 240 So. 2d 828, 829 (Sd D.C.A. Fla. 1970); City of Coral
Gables v. Jordan, 186 So. 2d 60, 62 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1966).
115. Formerly Fla. Stat. §54.28 (1965). The wording of § (3) of both statutes is exactly
the same: "The fact of such a release or covenant not to sue, or that any defendant has
been dismissed by order of the court shall not be made known to the jury."
116. 186 So. 2d at 62.
117. Id.
118. E.g., Josey v. Futch, 254 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1971); Stecher v. Pomeroy, 253 So. 2d 421
(Fla. 1971); Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970); Stella v. Craine,
281 So. 2d 584 (4th D.CA. Fla. 1973). Cf. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969);
Compania Dominicana de Aviacion v. Knapp, 251 So. 2d 18 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1971).
119. Compare the partly dissenting opinions of Justice Boyd and Chief Justice Ervin
in Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163, 166-69 (Fla. 1970), with Stecher v.
Pomeroy, 253 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1971).
120. 247 So. 2d 491 (2d D.C.A.), remanded for clarification, 254 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1971),
returned, 263 So. 2d 241 (2d D.C.A. 1972), cause dismissed, 279 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 1973).
121. 247 So. 2d at 492-93.
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Pomeroy,22 pointed out that it had abandoned the pre-Stecher rule that
mention of policy limits was prejudicial error as a matter of law. 123 The

Stecher decision had adopted the position that the "question of harmful error
in relation to mention of insurance policy limits [is] a factual question to
be determined by a review of the facts in each case."'' 2 4 Accordingly, the
supreme court returned the Futch case to the court of appeal for clarification
of whether harmful error was in fact committed at trial. 25 On remand, the
Second District Court of Appeal reconsidered its previous opinion, and in
view of both the doctrine promulgated in Stecher and the reasonableness
of the verdict for the seriously injured plaintiff, the court concluded it could
not find that the jury had been prejudicially influenced by the policy limits
126
in assessing damages.
It is not clear from Stecher and Futch whether the supreme court now
expressly authorizes deliberate introduction of liability insurance policy
limits at trial, in which case the motion in limine would be unavailable, or
whether it will merely tolerate certain inadvertent references to such policy
limits. It is clear, however, that the employment of the motion by defendants in Futch could have averted costly and extended litigation because
the sole point on appeal was the question of whether the mention of the
policy limits constituted harmful error. Granting the motion by separate
order in limine or by incorporating it into the pretrial order would have
foreclosed ab initio the introduction at trial of error that was the subject
of appellate litigation consuming two years and considerable cost.
The foregoing sampling of Florida cases is hardly a complete compendium
of instances in which the motion in limine could be employed effectively in
Florida civil litigation.127 It is presented simply to give practitioners a feel
122.
123.
124.
125.

253 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1971).
254 So. 2d at 787.
Id.
Id.

126.

263 So. 2d at 241. This reasoning parallels that forcibly advanced in the dissenting

opinions in Beta Eta House Corp. v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163, 166-69 (Fla. 1970). If it is
true, as these opinions suggest, that juries are no longer prejudiced by the mention of
insurance (and, in the present context, by the limits of the policy), then it would seem
that juries have changed significantly since the well-known University of Chicago jury

project of the late 1950's, where, as part of a broad study of juries, three series of mock
personal injury trials were conducted, identical in every respect

except the

issue of

insurance. In the first series of trials defendant disclosed he had no insurance; in the
second he revealed he had insurance, but nothing further was said about it; in the third

series, after his disclosure of the existence of insurance, his counsel objected, and the
court instructed the jury to disregard the issue of insurance. The average amounts of

damages awarded by the jury increased in proportion to the mention of insurance at
trial, from $33,000 in the first series to $46,000 in the third. Broeder, The University of
Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744, 753-54 (1959).
127. Space limitations preclude discussion of the following cases, examination of which
will suggest motions in limine could have been utilized effectively in each case by the

complaining parties to preclude the necessity for their objecting at trial to the prejudicial
matter and then being forced to argue harmful error on appeal: Tyus v. Apalachicola
N.R.R., 130 So. 2d 580, 588 (Fla. 1966) (O'Connell, J., dissenting); Luster v. Moore, 78
So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1955); Carls Markets v, Meyer, 69 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1953); Florida East Coast
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for the breadth of the types of actions and the kinds of prejudicial matters
28
that could properly be made the subject of this unusual procedural device.
CONCLUSION

As long as there are jury trials and lawyers to try them, there will always
be the possibility of prejudicial material being injected into the proceedings
so that the offended party is denied a fair trial. The development and use
in recent years of substantial pretrial procedural safeguards, coupled with
the efforts of most counsel to avoid prejudicial error, make it unlikely that
situations will often arise in Florida necessitating additional pretrial measures
to block the mention or offer of prejudicial matters. 29 Where such occasions
arise, however, counsel may find resort to the motion in limine helpful. Its
potentially wide application and its availability to both sides in civil litigation serve the purpose of assisting courts and counsel in further reducing the
possibility of harmful error at trial.
ROBERT T.

HYDE, JR.

Ry. v. Young, 104 Fla. 541, 140 So. 467 (1932); Green v. The Jesters, 199 So. 785 (1st D.C.A.
Fla. 1967); Carlton v. Johns, 194 So. 2d 670 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1967); Johnny Roberts, Inc.
v. Owens, 168 So. 2d 89 (2d D.CA. 1964), cert. denied, 173 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1965); Pensacola
Transit Co. v. Denton, 119 So. 2d 296 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
128. See notes 93-97 supra and accompanying text.
129. See note 15 supra.

APPENDIX
SUGGESTED FORT

OF MOnON

In Limine

FOR

USE

IN FLORIDA

(Plaintiff/Defendant), before trial and selection of a jury, moves the court in limine
to instruct the (defendant/plaintiff) and all its counsel and witnesses as set forth below
on the following grounds:
1. Since it is immaterial to this suit whether or not:
(a) (Plaintiff/Defendant) had a driver's license on the occasion in question;
(b) (Plaintiff/Defendant) was issued a traffic citation as a result of the automobile
accident in question;
(c) (Plaintiff/Defendant) has ever been convicted of the offense of driving while
intoxicated;
(d) (Defendant/Plaintiff) was not issued a traffic citation as a result of the automobile accident in question;
the (defendant/plaintiff) is precluded from using any pleading, testimony, remarks, questions, or arguments that might inform the jury of such facts.
2. Were any of the above facts made known to the jury, it would be highly improper
and prejudicial to (plaintiff/defendant), even though the Court were to sustain an objection or motion to strike and instruct the jury not to consider such facts for any purpose.
In all probability any such attempt on the part of (defendant/plaintiff), its counsel, or
witnesses, would result in a costly mistrial.
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